NEGATIVE BRIEF: Saudi Arabia Alliance Good

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COUNTER CRITERION

Let’s carefully define “Human Rights” to include: stability, quality of governance, economic growth and ordinary conditions of life

Anthony Cordesman 2014. (holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies; recipient of the Dept of Defense Distinguished Service Medal; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; masters degree in International Studies, International Security, Middle East from Univ of Denver )17 Mar 2014 The Need for a New “Realism” in the US-Saudi Alliance <http://csis.org/publication/need-new-realism-us-saudi-alliance>

At the same time, the United States did need to be far more pragmatic about the impact instability in Egypt could have on Saudi Arabia and the entire region – and about the fact that the regime was creating an economic nightmare for the Egyptian people. The United States needs more balance in defining human rights in terms of stability, the quality of governance, economic growth, and the ordinary conditions of life.

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Net Benefits: Middle East problems are best helped by US/Saudi cooperation. Without it, things will get far worse

Anthony Cordesman 2014. (holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies; recipient of the Dept of Defense Distinguished Service Medal; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; masters degree in International Studies, International Security, Middle East from Univ of Denver )17 Mar 2014 The Need for a New “Realism” in the US-Saudi Alliance <http://csis.org/publication/need-new-realism-us-saudi-alliance>

There are always good reasons to avoid trying to jump the chasm between analysis and prophecy, but the United States and Saudi Arabia probably do face a future in the Middle East where most – and possibly all – of the problems that have just been listed will require years to deal with. The United States and Saudi Arabia – as well as their allies – face a future where today’s challenges have no quick and convincing answer and where more problems are likely to get worse in the near term than get better. The fact that there are very real limits to both U.S. and Saudi resources is a further reason to cooperate. Far too often, conflicting policies, unstable patterns of military and economic aid, waste the limited resources that are available. The leverage that can be gained through cooperation – and through avoiding having one state seem to set conditions for another – are lost. There may be bright spots in the future. The Iranian nuclear issue offers at least some hope, and even “at most a 50% probability” is far better than none. In broad terms, however, there has never been a stronger case for a functioning U.S. and Saudi alliance and for realism, and effective cooperation. Neither side can afford to ignore the other’s needs, and all of the alternatives to a more effective partnership are far, far worse.

We need Saudi Arabia: They’re key to security, stability, countering Iran, peace plan with Israel, and war on terrorism

Anthony H. Cordesman 2011 (holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS; recipient of the Dept of Defense Distinguished Service Medal), February 26, 2011, “Understanding Saudi Stability and Instability: A Very Different Nation,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, <http://csis.org/publication/understanding-saudi-stability-and-instability-very-different-nation>

Saudi Arabia is as important to the region’s security and stability as it is to the world’s economy. It is the key to the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council to create local defenses, and for US strategic cooperation with the Southern Gulf states. It plays a critical role as a counterbalance to a radical and more aggressive Iran, it is the source of the Arab League plan for a peace with Israel, and it has become a key partner in the war on terrorism. The US strategic posture in the Middle East depends on Saudi Arabia having a friendly and moderate regime.

Saudi Arabia is central to America’s interests in the Middle East and vital to US energy security.

The Associated Press 2011 (News Agency) December 29, 2011 “U.S. sells $30B worth of fighter jets to Saudis” NY DAILY NEWS <http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-12-29/news/30570700_1_fighter-jets-saudi-arabia-iran>

The plan initially raised concerns from pro-Israeli lawmakers, but U.S. officials reassured Congress that Israel's military edge would not be undercut by the sale. Additionally, there is now broad agreement among Israel, the Gulf Arab states and the West that Iran poses a significant and unpredictable threat. Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter regional rivals. Tensions between them were further stoked earlier this year after the U.S. accused Iran of plotting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. in Washington. Saudi Arabia is already the most militarily advanced of the Arab Gulf states, one of the richest countries in the world, and central to American policy in the Middle East. It is also vital to U.S. energy security, with Saudi Arabia ranking as the third-largest source of U.S. oil imports.

INHERENCY

Saudi Arabia has made combating terrorism priority and has had success

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011. (PhD from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of London and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program), September 12, 2011, “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#terror>

Saudi Arabia has made combating terrorism a major priority. Terrorism is one of the biggest threats that Riyadh faces. Before 2003, the effectiveness of Riyadh’s counterterrorism activities was questionable at best. But in response to the rising levels of violence in the country in 2003 through 2006, the government did a good job of clamping down. There are not too many countries that have successfully dismantled and muzzled terrorism like Saudi Arabia has done. The government dedicated a great deal of money to the issue and employed both hard-security methods and softer tactics. This included arrests, better intelligence, amnesties, and counter-radicalization programs, as well as efforts by the governing and religious establishments to mobilize the population against terrorist activities.

Conditions for Saudi women are sure to improve.

Council on Foreign Relations quoting Thomas Lippman 2012 (Thomas W. Lippman is adjunct senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). In addition, he is currently a member of a study group on Saudi Arabia convened jointly by Princeton University and the Institute des Sciences Politiques in France. In 2005 he was a lecturer on Middle Eastern affairs at the National Defense University and at the Brookings Institution. He has also been also a consultant to the U.S. Marine Corps, and to the National Counterterrorism Center; adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington.) January 13, 2012 “Saudi Arabia Remains Indispensable U.S. Ally, Argues New CFR Book” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS <http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-remains-indispensable-us-ally-argues-new-cfr-book/p27072> (Brackets added)

If there is one certainty about policy change in Saudi Arabia, "it is that the rules governing female behavior will be relaxed and that women will find new opportunities in the country's workplace and in its social and economic life," he [Thomas Lippman] writes. "Saudi Arabia is coming to the collective realization that it can no longer afford to pump vast resources into educating women at enormous expense without recovering the constructive energy and economic productivity of those educated graduates," Lippman explains. Basing his work on interviews and field research conducted in the kingdom from 2008 through 2011 while an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Lippman, now at the Middle East Institute, dissects the central paradox of the U.S.-Saudi relationship: both countries need each other, yet they both remain fundamentally different.

King Abdullah is creating social reforms and opposing terrorism

Christopher M. Blanchard 2011. (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service) March 10, 2011 Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

Since taking power in 2005, King Abdullah has created greater public space for domestic social reform debates and has promoted the concept of a strong national identity among Saudis in the face of a determined domestic terrorism campaign. He also has codified royal succession rules, begun restructuring the justice system, and taken clear steps to exert stronger government control over religious authorities. Robust oil export revenues have strengthened the kingdom’s economic position and provide Saudi leaders with significant financial resources to meet domestic investment needs and provide social benefits.

“Blocking Peace with Israel” - Response: Saudis support Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. It’s Israel’s settlement policy that’s causing problems

Christopher M. Blanchard 2011. (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service) March 10, 2011 Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (brackets in original) <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

In 2010, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud had expressed Saudi leaders’ appreciation for “the prompt movement of the U.S. Administration to resuscitate the [Israeli-Palestinian] peace process and to treat the major issue of conflict within the framework of the two-state solution which aims at an autonomous and viable Palestinian state.” Prince Saud al Faisal supported the Obama Administration’s late 2010 attempt to restart Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, while continuing to vocally and vehemently criticize Israeli settlement activity, particularly in the environs of Jerusalem. In September 2010, he described Israel’s settlement policy as aiming “to change facts on the ground and thus jeopardize the peace process and render the negotiations meaningless.” This perspective is widely shared by many Saudis.

Saudis have offered a peace deal for Israel

Prince Turki Al Faisal Al Saud 2011. Prince Turki is Chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and is one of the founders of the King Faisal Foundation. He served as the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States of America “Palestinian rights won’t be denied by the United States and Israel” June 2011 <http://www.susris.com/2011/06/13/september-un-showdown-turki-al-faisal/>

In 2002 King Abdullah offered what has become the Arab Peace Initiative. Based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, it calls for an end to the conflict based on land for peace. The Israelis withdraw from all occupied lands, including East Jerusalem, reach a mutually agreed solution to the Palestinian refugees, and recognize the Palestinian state. In return, they will get full diplomatic recognition from the Arab world and all the Muslim states, an end to hostilities and normal relations with all these states. Now, it is the Israelis who are saying no.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

Saudi Government Collapse

There are only small protests in Saudi Arabia which will not affect the government.

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011 (Ph.D. from Univ of London. Formerly a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton Univ and lecturer in Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School; previously a media analyst at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington; worked for several years at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies in London; frequently briefs U.S. and European governments and government agencies on terrorism, Islamist militancy, and security issues in the Arabian Peninsula; has provided expert testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.) September 20, 2011 “Rivals—Iran vs. Saudi Arabia” CAREGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/20/rivals-iran-vs.-saudi-arabia/68jg#protests>

Saudi Arabia can manage the Arab awakening internally better than anyone else in the Middle East—although this does not mean that Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy objectives are in any way helped by the change. While it is not immune from the protest movement inside the country, Riyadh is more equipped to handle it through its religious community and financial resources. Saudi Arabia announced over $130 billion in new social welfare spending and the protests within the country have been very small thus far.

Terrorism Funding/Support

Saudi government has done quite a bit to crack down on terrorist fundraising

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011. (PhD from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of London and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program), September 12, 2011, “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#terror>

With the Hajj attracting millions of Muslims every year to Mecca, there are ample opportunities to make connections and fundraise with people from all over the world. It is relatively easy to get money for many things in Saudi Arabia—and there is certainly money to be had. And terrorist groups can receive cash (or other convertible instruments) from individuals and groups even today, because there are still people who believe in the actions of these groups. The government has done quite a bit to crack down on fundraising. Laws have been implemented to curtail sending charitable money abroad outside government channels. People are not allowed to fundraise in mosques or on the streets, although such fundraising likely persists to some degree. There have also been educational and advertising campaigns letting people know that such money is often used for illicit activities—this has helped increase awareness about the methods terror groups use to raise funds. A fatwa was also issued saying that raising money for terrorism is the same as being a terrorist. And many prominent religious officials have condemned terrorism and worked hard to undermine support for terrorism and counter the intellectual or ideological justifications for terrorist activities.

Saudi Arabia plays leading role in reducing terrorism out of Yemen

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011. (PhD from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of London and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program), September 12, 2011, “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (brackets added) <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#terror>

In August 2009, AQAP [Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula], the al-Qaeda affiliate based in Yemen, tried to assassinate Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the head of Saudi Arabia’s antiterrorism efforts. It has been reported in the Saudi press that Prince Mohammed has survived four assassination attempts linked to Yemeni-based militants. So the situation in Yemen is personal for Saudi Arabia—Riyadh considers the terrorists in Yemen a major threat. Saudi Arabia is Yemen’s largest foreign aid donor—by far. Riyadh’s primary concern with Yemen is its stability and security, particularly the Saudi nationals affiliated with AQAP hiding out in the country. Saudi Arabia is spending more money on counterterrorism training and improving intelligence collection. Saudi Arabia’s influence and interest in combating terrorists operating in its smaller neighbor mean that Riyadh has a leading role in reducing the threat of terrorism coming out of Yemen.

**SOLVENCY**

Saudi Arabia views monarch as absolutely essential, and would never allow democracy.

Prof. Gregory Gauss 2012 (professor political science Univ of Vermont) January 26, 2012 “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS <http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-new-middle-east/p27205>

I think that Saudi Arabia's clearly counterrevolutionary when it comes to monarchy. It sees monarchy as absolutely essential. It sees the preservation of monarchy, particularly in its geographical area, the Gulf -- and we'll include Jordan in that -- as absolutely essential to its own domestic regime security and stability. And thus for Saudi Arabia, the preservation of monarchy in the Gulf Cooperation Council and in Jordan is a domestic political imperative.

Saudis are trying to stop terror fundraising - but they can’t solve for all the private activity

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011 (Ph.D. from the University of London. Formerly a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University and lecturer in Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School. He was also previously a media analyst at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C., and worked for several years at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies in London, where he remains an associate fellow. Recognized expert on terrorism, security, and stability issues in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. He frequently briefs U.S. and European governments and government agencies on terrorism, Islamist militancy, and security issues in the Arabian Peninsula. He has provided expert testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.) September 12, 2011 “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia” CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#saudis>

The government has done quite a bit to crack down on fundraising. Laws have been implemented to curtail sending charitable money abroad outside government channels. People are not allowed to fundraise in mosques or on the streets, although such fundraising likely persists to some degree. There have also been educational and advertising campaigns letting people know that such money is often used for illicit activities—this has helped increase awareness about the methods terror groups use to raise funds. A fatwa was also issued saying that raising money for terrorism is the same as being a terrorist. And many prominent religious officials have condemned terrorism and worked hard to undermine support for terrorism and counter the intellectual or ideological justifications for terrorist activities. But the real problem is that we are talking about mostly small amounts of money and often cash, so it is incredibly difficult to regulate and prevent. Saudi Arabia is good at cracking down on terrorism, but the financing is incredibly hard to control. There are people who give money that gets diverted to other purposes and groups that use similar methods to collect cash.

DISADVANTAGES

Note: A frequent AFF response to disruptions in oil supplies is “markets will solve.” The card below can be used with lots of disadvantages to respond in Rebuttals to this AFF argument.

“Markets will solve for oil prices” - Response: If supply problems become severe, oil markets could fail altogether

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” THE ECONOMIST <http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

If the supply situation worsens, opportunities for this type of substitution will be fewer, creating supply bottlenecks, shortages of petrol and spikes within price spikes for different crudes and products, even when spare capacity remains. The price differential of about $15 a barrel that has built up between Brent crude, which more closely reflects global trade, and West Texas Intermediate, the benchmark for oil prices in America, is a good example of how oil markets can become distorted by local patterns of supply and demand. If supply gets even more stretched, oil could fetch a far higher price in some parts of the world than others. If supply problems become really grave, oil companies may even declare *force majeure*, raising the prospect that, as in 1978, oil markets fail altogether.

1. Success = Failure. If the plan succeeds at encouraging Saudi regime change, the end result will be worse. Middle East history proves that change goes from bad to worse

Anthony Cordesman 2014. (holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies; recipient of the Dept of Defense Distinguished Service Medal; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; masters degree in International Studies, International Security, Middle East from Univ of Denver )17 Mar 2014 The Need for a New “Realism” in the US-Saudi Alliance <http://csis.org/publication/need-new-realism-us-saudi-alliance>

Americans needs to see the region through Saudi eyes, not just their own. They need to see how urgent the mix of threats are that Saudi Arabia, the other Southern Gulf states, and Arab countries like Jordan see around them. They also need to take careful heed to the lessons from political upheavals in the region to date. None have led to stable democracies, economic stability much less economic development, or improvements in the rule of law and human rights. Most have led to sharp rises in civil violence and some to civil war, most have led to serious economic decline, and most have led to serious reductions in living conditions.

2. Religious Extremism

Link: US needs to work closely with Saudi Arabia to break down barriers between Islamic groups

Brink/Uniqueness: Efforts are underway, but they need to be expanded

Impact: We must block religious extremism from coming to power or else violence will grow and turn into a major tragedy

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The broader threat in the region is not that Islamic extremism will lead to a clash between civilizations but that it will become a steadily more divisive and violent clash within a religion – not only on a sect-by-sect basis but between an unworkable vision of religious rule and law and the need to live in a modern and increasingly globalized world. For the United States and Saudi Arabia to pretend this risk does not exist – and fail to work together with other states to reduce it – would be a major tragedy. At the same time, this is a struggle where Saudi Arabia must be a key leader. The United States needs to work closely – but quietly – with Saudi Arabia in its efforts to create a broader religious dialogue, and to break down the barriers and growing hostility between Islamic sects. The is an effort some senior princes already are pursuing, and it needs to be coupled to broader efforts to ensure that moderate and more pragmatic regimes get support in economic development and improved governance. The United States needs to be more pragmatic about the need for stable and effective governance, and that the immediate challenge in the region is not democracy or idealized human rights but preventing religious extremism from block progress or coming to power.

3. Increased terrorism

Link: The US and Saudi Arabia have excellent cooperation against terrorism. Impact: The world is safer from terrorism with Saudi Arabian cooperation than without.

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011 (Ph.D. from the University of London. Formerly a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University and lecturer in Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School; previously a media analyst at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, and worked for several years at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies in London; has testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.) September 12, 2011 “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia” CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#saudis>

This is one of the better relationships in the world on counterterrorism. The cooperation between Washington and Riyadh is strong and on the issue of terrorism the Saudis and Americans basically see eye to eye. There is also a regular exchange of information to help both countries prevent attacks. This was not the case for the first few years after 9/11, as Saudi Arabia did not fully appreciate the problem. But when violence started in Saudi Arabia in 2003, the relationship with the United States on terrorism improved markedly and quickly grew strong. Now there are programs to improve the security of Saudi’s energy infrastructure, training, officials share databases, photos, fingerprints, etc., and there is a great deal of cooperation on Yemen where there are Saudis hiding out and operating with AQAP. The relationship today shows how two governments can cooperate. If every country was willing to cooperate like Saudi Arabia, the world would be a much safer place. There are two things that are needed to fight terrorism—political will and capacity. Saudi Arabia has demonstrated both. Other countries haven’t. Saudi Arabia recognized that it was at risk of terrorism and then focused a great deal of attention on the problem.

Link: Saudi Arabia currently helps the US combat terrorism and is one of the best success stories for defeating terrorism.

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011 ( Ph.D. from the University of London. Formerly a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University and lecturer in Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School. He was also previously a media analyst at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C., and worked for several years at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies in London, where he remains an associate fellow; has provided expert testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.) September 12, 2011 “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia” CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf>

Fifteen of the nineteen al-Qaeda hijackers involved in the September 11 attacks were from Saudi Arabia. In the decade since 9/11, Riyadh has been credited as an invaluable partner to Washington in fighting global terror and as one of the world’s best success stories for how to defeat domestic terrorist activities through law enforcement, security and intelligence measures, education, and rehabilitation. Still, some Saudi nationals remain an important source of funding for terrorist networks despite Riyadh’s efforts to crack down on illicit financing.

Example: Saudi cooperation led to blocking a cargo package terror incident in Yemen, 2010

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011. (PhD from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of London and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program), September 12, 2011, “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#terror>

And the Saudis can do things in Yemen that Americans cannot. Saudis tipped off U.S. officials to the bombs concealed inside cargo packages destined for the United States in October 2010, demonstrating the good intelligence that Riyadh collects and shares with Washington. This averted what was likely to be a major attack.”

4. Loss of Saudi oil market stabilization

Link: Saudi Arabia is the second largest source of imported oil for the United States

US Dept of Energy 2014. Energy Information Administration "Country Level Imports" April 2014[http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/imports/companylevel/](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.eia.gov%2Fpetroleum%2Fimports%2Fcompanylevel%2F&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNGtIlEoK_uWsP0tt64hcamVvROYZg" \t "_blank)

The top five exporting countries accounted for approximately 82 percent of United States crude oil imports in April while the top ten sources accounted for approximately 95 percent of all U.S. crude oil imports. The top five sources of US crude oil imports for April were Canada (2,769 thousand barrels per day), Saudi Arabia (1,579 thousand barrels per day), Venezuela (781 thousand barrels per day), Mexico (690 thousand barrels per day), and Kuwait (342 thousand barrels per day).

Link: We can’t disengage from Saudis - they’re key to moderating world energy prices and meeting global demand.

**Dr Ali Alyami, who advocates human rights reform in Saudi Arabia, nevertheless admitted in 2008:**

Dr. Ali Alyami 2008. (PhD from Claremont Graduate Univ.; originally a native of Saudi Arabia, lived in USA since 1967; advocates for human rights reform in S.A. as Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia) Saudi Arabia: The Gathering Storm, Fall 2008 - Number 15 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS [http://spengler.atimes.net/viewtopic.php?p=273988](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fspengler.atimes.net%2Fviewtopic.php%3Fp%3D273988&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNG4t7I5KUxuSRrS2qo1Q8-Q8pbNAw" \t "_blank)

And yet, complete disengagement is not an option, especially at a time when the Saudi monarchy is losing control at home and influence in the Gulf and globally. Given global demands for oil and the abundance of this commodity under the control of the House of Saud, the next U.S. administration will have to deal with Riyadh in some fashion, not only to protect what some have called “our largest single overseas private enterprise,” but to moderate world energy prices and to meet unprecedented global demands.

Impact: Oil price shocks hurt the US and world economy

Dr. Shiu-Sheng Chen & Kai-Wei Hsu 2012. (Chen - PhD economics; professor of economics at National Taiwan University; Hsu - economics department, National Taiwan University) Reverse Globalization: Does High Oil Price Volatility Discourage International Trade? Jan 2012, <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36182/1/MPRA_paper_36182.pdf>

It has been shown that the dramatic rise in oil prices during the 1970s was associated with subsequent economic downturns. Although there is some debate as to whether oil price shocks are the main cause of recessions, Hamilton (2009b) asserts that the latest surge in oil prices between June 2007 and June 2008 was an important factor that contributed to the economic recession that began in the US in 2007:Q4. Moreover, a number of recent studies show that oil price shocks have significant effects on a variety of domestic economic activities. An increase in oil prices has a significant negative impact on GDP growth and contributes to a higher inflation rate for most countries (see Hamilton (2009a), Cologni and Manera (2008), and Lardic and Mignon (2008)). Finally, Ordonez et al. (2011) show that the oil price shock is an important driving force of the cyclical labor adjustments in the US labor market, and the job-finding probability is the main transmission mechanism of such a shock.

5. Vulnerable Saudi oil facilities.

Link: The US is currently helping to protect Saudi Arabian oil.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” ABC NEWS [http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/05/19/quietly-expanding-defense-ties-saudis/](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.foxnews.com%2Fpolitics%2F2011%2F05%2F19%2Fquietly-expanding-defense-ties-saudis%2F&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNGcnlq5XO4I1lYCidEjbFzB118vgw" \t "_blank)

Despite their deepening political divide, the United States and Saudi Arabia are quietly expanding defense ties on a vast scale, led by a little-known project to develop an elite force to protect the kingdom's oil riches and future nuclear sites. The U.S. also is in discussions with Saudi Arabia to create an air and missile defense system with far greater capability against the regional rival the Saudis fear most, Iran. And it is with Iran mainly in mind that the Saudis are pressing ahead with a historic $60 billion arms deal that will provide dozens of new U.S.-built F-15 combat aircraft likely to ensure Saudi air superiority over Iran for years.

Link: Saudi oil facilities are vulnerable to attack.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” ABC NEWS [http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/05/19/quietly-expanding-defense-ties-saudis/](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.foxnews.com%2Fpolitics%2F2011%2F05%2F19%2Fquietly-expanding-defense-ties-saudis%2F&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNGcnlq5XO4I1lYCidEjbFzB118vgw" \t "_blank)

The Saudis' security worries were heightened by a failed al-Qaida car bombing in February 2006 of the Abqaiq oil processing facility, one of the largest in the world. The State Department cable said a subsequent U.S. assessment of Abqaiq security standards determined that it remained "highly vulnerable to other types of sophisticated terrorist attacks." That warning was conveyed to top Saudi officials on Oct. 27, 2008. "The Saudis remain highly concerned about the vulnerability of their energy production facilities," the cable said. "They recognize many of their energy facilities remain at risk from al-Qaida and other terrorists who seek to disrupt the global economy."

Brink: Even the smallest disruption would have a disproportionate impact.

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” (brackets added) THE ECONOMIST <http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

That is still a remote prospect and the upward march of the oil price seems to have paused for now. The crucial question is how much oil will be lost, and for how long. When oil markets operate at the limits of supply, even the smallest extra disruption has a disproportionate effect. On February 26th, for example, Iraq’s biggest refinery shut down after a terrorist attack. This and other assaults could knock out another 500,000 b/d [barrels per day] from the world’s fuel supplies. And if the raids on oil installations in previous elections in Nigeria are anything to go by, the next one, in April, may threaten another 1m b/d of supplies from west Africa. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia remains far from secure (see article). On March 1st the country’s stock market, jittery about the neighbors, plunged by 7%, a worrying sign that confidence is fading.

Brink: Saudi Arabia is the focal point of the global oil market.

Christopher M. Blanchard 2011 (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Service) March 10, 2011 “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

With the world’s largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 266.7 billion barrels), Saudi Arabia produced roughly 8.6 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil as of late December 2010, an increase over the prevailing level for most of 2009 and 2010, but well below the record high production of 9.7 million bpd in mid-2008. Saudi oil reserves, oil exports, and spare oil production capacity make the kingdom the focal point for the global oil market, and recent political unrest in the Middle East has contributed to market concerns and price increases. Saudi Aramco recently completed a multi-year, multi-billion dollar production capacity expansion project that raised its daily crude oil production capacity to 12.5 million bpd. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as of December 2010, Saudi Arabia was the third largest source of U.S oil imports, about 1.1 million bpd of 11.1 million bpd gross U.S. imports, behind only Canada and Mexico.

Impact: Collapse of Saudi oil production leads to world economic harm

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

A collapse of Saudi oil production would drastically affect global energy and the economic situation. The economic performance of national economies around the world would suffer, with some falling into deep recession.

Impact: Global economic downturn.

Gavyn Davies 2011 (Gavyn Davies is a macroeconomist who is now chairman of Fulcrum Asset Management and co-founder of Prisma Capital Partners. He was the head of the global economics department at Goldman Sachs from 1987-2001, and was chairman of the BBC from 2001-2004. He has also served as an economic policy adviser in No 10 Downing Street, an external adviser to the British Treasury, and as a visiting professor at the London School of Economics.) February 24, 2011 “How big is the 2011 oil price shock?” FINANCIAL TIMES BLOG <http://blogs.ft.com/gavyndavies/2011/02/24/how-big-is-the-2011-oil-price-shock/>

Each of the last five major downturns in global economic activity has been immediately preceded by a major spike in oil prices. Sometimes (e.g. in the 1970s and in 1990), the surge in oil prices has been due to supply restrictions, triggered by OPEC or by war in the Middle East. Other times (e.g. in 2008), it has been due to rapid growth in the demand for oil. But in both cases the contractionary effects of higher energy prices have eventually proven too much for the world economy to shrug off. With the global average price of oil having moved above $100 per barrel in recent days – about 33 per cent higher than the price last summer – it is natural to fear that this latest oil shock may be enough to kill the global economic recovery. But oil prices would have to rise much further, and persist for much longer, for these fears to be justified.

“Saudis can form other defensive alliances” - Response: No other country can defend Saudi Arabia - they’ve already tried

Dr. David Ottaway 2011. ( PhD in political science; Senior Scholar in the Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) Uncle Sam and the Saudi Split, FOREIGN POLICY, 23 Sept 2011 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/23/uncle_sam_and_the_saudi_split?page=0,1>

It is worth remembering that Saudi King Abdullah became so furious with President George W. Bush just before 9/11 that he wrote an angry letter warning that if Washington did not do something quickly to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, Saudi Arabia intended to freeze its relations with Washington and go its own way. Bush scrambled to pacify the king, but the presence of 15 Saudis among the 9/11 hijackers so traumatized both countries that their relations effectively froze anyway. King Abdullah then cast about for other political and military partners that could replace the United States, engaging in an exchange of visits with the leaders of China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey. But he soon discovered that none was likely, or even militarily capable, of coming to the kingdom's rescue the way the United States had done when Iraqi forces rolled across Kuwait to the Saudi border in August 1990.

6. Lost military hardware exports.

Link: Saudi Arabia is the largest US trading partner in the Middle East.

Christopher M. Blanchard 2011 (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Service) March 10, 2011 “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

Saudi Arabia remained the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East in 2010. According to the U.S. International Trade Administration, Saudi exports to the United States were $31.4 billion (up from $22 billion in 2009 but below the 2008 figure of $54.8 billion) and U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia are estimated at $11.6 billion (up from $10.8 billion in 2009 but below the 2008 figure of $12.5 billion). Comparable 2010 figures for Israel, the second-largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East, were nearly $21 billion in exports to the United States and $11.3 billion in imports from the United States. To a considerable extent, the high value of U.S.-Saudi trade is dictated by U.S. imports of hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia and U.S. exports of weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia. Fluctuations in the volume and value of U.S.-Saudi oil trade account for declines in the value of Saudi exports to the U.S. in recent years.

Brink: The US recently instituted a new arms deal with Saudi Arabia.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” FOX NEWS [http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/05/19/quietly-expanding-defense-ties-saudis/](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.foxnews.com%2Fus%2F2011%2F05%2F19%2Fquietly-expanding-defense-ties-saudis%2F&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNEcYWHcA64E24fj0SjyNaGYY1Fizg" \t "_blank)

Even so, Saudi Arabia has become one of Washington's most valued counterterrorism partners. It also is a top client for U.S. arms. When Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Riyadh in April, he reaffirmed U.S. intentions to proceed with the deal announced last fall to sell up to $60 billion in weaponry, including 84 F-15s and the upgrading of 70 existing Saudi F-15s. U.S. officials said the arms deal might be expanded to include naval ships and possibly more advanced air and missile defense systems. The Saudis want to upgrade their Patriot air defenses to the latest U.S. version, which can knock down short-range ballistic missiles in flight. And they have expressed interest in a more capable system designed to defend against higher-flying, medium-range missiles.

Impact: Lose 50,000 jobs and $3.5 billion annually.

David Jackson 2011 (USA Today Reporter) Updated December 29, 2011 “U.S. arms sale to Saudis: Jobs and a message to Iran” USA TODAY (Mr Earnest name is misspelled Earnet in the original at the first reference) <http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/12/obama-team-makes-294b-arms-sale-to-saudis/1#.T4nfYqtSTzN>

In announcing the new arms deal with Saudi Arabia, White House spokesman Josh Earnet said: "Valued at $29.4 billion, this agreement includes production of 84 new aircraft and the modernization of 70 existing aircraft as well as munitions, spare parts, training, maintenance and logistics." "These F-15SA aircraft, manufactured by the Boeing Company, are among the most sophisticated and capable aircraft in the world," Earnest said. Earnest also said in a statement: "This agreement will positively impact the U.S. economy and further advances the president's commitment to create jobs by increasing exports. According to industry experts, this agreement will support more than 50,000 American jobs, engaging 600 suppliers in 44 states, and providing $3.5 billion in annual economic impact to the U.S. economy. This agreement reinforces the strong and enduring relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and demonstrates the U.S. commitment to a strong Saudi defense capability as a key component to regional security."

7. More Iranian influence.

Link: The alliance between the US and Saudi Arabia is critical to countering Iranian influence.

Anthony H. Cordesman, Peter Alsis, Marissa Allison 2011 (Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. He has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies on the wars in those countries. He frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries. Before joining CSIS, Cordesman served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. Peter Alsis is a researcher at Military OneSource and a Burke Chair Intern at CSIS. He has a MA, International Studies, International Security; Middle East from the University of Denver. Marissa S. Allison, a History and Middle Eastern Studies graduate (2010) of the University of Mary Washington, was a research intern at the Palestine-Israel Journal in Jerusalem, and at a Baghdad Embassy virtual internship.) November 16, 2011 “US and Iranian Strategic Competition in the Gulf States and Yemen” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES [http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-role-southern-gulf-states-and-yemen](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fcsis.org%2Fpublication%2Fus-and-iranian-strategic-competition-role-southern-gulf-states-and-yemen&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNFSDVBUnKzwSaY3DibtcjKP1O8q5w" \t "_blank)

The Gulf is the strategic center of the competition between the US and Iran. The stability of the Gulf is critical to the global economy, as roughly 40 percent of the world’s oil trade is transported through the Strait of Hormuz, which at its narrowest point is just 21 miles wide. The US support for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in their broader competition with Iran is the fundamental relationship driving US-Iranian completion in the Gulf. The Gulf is a primary strategic economic, political, and military interest to the US, and this makes the de facto alliance between the US and the Southern Gulf states critical to the success of US competition with Iran. The US once depended on a “twin pillar” policy of allying with both the Saudis and the Iranian Shah to secure its interests in the region. The Iranian Revolution (1979) toppled the US-installed Shah, effectively ending this policy and established Iran as an adversary to the US-Saudi relationship. As a result, Saudi Arabia and the other Southern Gulf states have become critical partners in countering Iranian influence.

Brink: The United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia is extremely sensitive.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” FOX NEWS [http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/05/19/quietly-expanding-defense-ties-saudis/](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.foxnews.com%2Fus%2F2011%2F05%2F19%2Fquietly-expanding-defense-ties-saudis%2F&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNEcYWHcA64E24fj0SjyNaGYY1Fizg" \t "_blank)

Saudi Arabia is central to American policy in the Middle East. It is a key player in the Arab-Israeli peace process that President Obama has so far failed to advance, and it is vital to U.S. energy security, with Saudi Arabia ranking as the third-largest source of U.S. oil imports. It also figures prominently in U.S. efforts to undercut Islamic extremism and promote democracy. The forging of closer U.S.-Saudi military ties is so sensitive, particularly in Saudi Arabia, that the Pentagon and the State Department declined requests for on-the-record comment and U.S. officials rejected a request for an interview with the two-star Army general, Robert G. Catalanotti, who manages the project to build a "facilities security force" to protect the Saudis' network of oil installations and other critical infrastructure.

Impact: Terrorism and confrontation. Iran foments terrorism and confrontation in the region

Dr. Ariel Cohen and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation) Iran’s Menace in Azerbaijan, 16 Mar 2012 <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/03/16/irans-menace-in-azerbaijan/>

Iranians are not only operating terrorist networks on Azerbaijani territory, but are also allegedly behind the 2006 murder of Rafik Tagi, a prominent Azeri writer against whom an Iranian ayatollah issued a fatwa sentencing him to death. The third wave of anti-terrorist arrests since the beginning of the year is seen as a reprisal by Baku to signal to Iran to “play by the rules.” Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have been steadily deteriorating as Azerbaijan continues to develop its ties to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States has been leading the effort to impose sanctions to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. It is possible that Iran is growing more wary and aggressive as sanctions start to bite. Azerbaijan is not the only country in the region that Iran targets. Iranian intelligence and its Hezbollah subsidiary recently conducted operations against Israeli targets in Tbilisi, Georgia, New Delhi, and Bangkok. According to some experts, Iran is wary of a major confrontation and wants to provoke Israel into smaller confrontations, because it needs an external threat around which it can organize its increasingly dissatisfied population.

8. End of the Petrodollar

Link: Affirmative removes US military protection from Saudi Arabia

Link: The “Petrodollar” arrangement. Saudi pricing of oil in dollars depends on US military protection

Jerry Robinson 2012 (Economist, holds a Bachelor's degree in Economics with Honors from the University of Tulsa. He has taught a course in macroeconomics at the college level. In addition, appeared on numerous TV and radio programs, including FoxNews, to discuss global economic topics. Robinson has been quoted by USA Today and other news agencies on the topic of the economy, and his columns have appeared regularly in numerous print and web publications) April 19, 2012 “Meet the System That Will Collapse the U.S. Dollar (Part 1)” FTM DAILY <http://ftmdaily.com/energy-crisis/the-petrodollar-system-101-the-beginning/>

The petrodollar system originated in the early 1970’s in the wake of the Bretton Woods collapse. In a series of highly secret meetings, the U.S. – represented by then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger according to many commentators – and the Saudi Royal Family made a powerful agreement. According to the agreement, the U.S. offered military protection for Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. What did the U.S. want in exchange? For Saudi Arabia to agree to price all of their oil sales in U.S. dollars and to then invest their surplus oil proceeds into U.S. Treasury Bills. This system was later referred to as “petrodollar recycling” by Henry Kissinger. The Saudis agreed and the petrodollar system was born.

Link: Petrodollar established the US dollar’s status as a world reserve currency

Dr. Scott S. Powell 2012. (Ph.D. in political and economic theory from Boston University) 10 Apr 2012 As U.S. Debt Soars, Dollar May Lose Reserve Status, INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, <http://www.discovery.org/a/18671>

What saved the greenback after Nixon removed the U.S. dollar from the gold standard in 1971 — ending the post-war Bretton Woods international financial order — was the status of U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of the world. This began with Saudi Arabia agreeing in 1973 to accept only U.S. dollars as payment for oil in exchange for U.S. protection of the Saudi monarchy and its oilfields. By 1975, the reserve currency status of the U.S. dollar was firmly established, with OPEC members agreeing to trade only in dollars. Trading of other commodities came to be priced in dollars, which reinforced the reserve currency status of the dollar.

Link & Brink: Collapse of the dollar is closer than we realize as erosion of the dollar as a reserve currency happens while the federal debt grows

Dr. Scott S. Powell 2012. (Ph.D. in political and economic theory from Boston University) 10 Apr 2012 As U.S. Debt Soars, Dollar May Lose Reserve Status, INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, <http://www.discovery.org/a/18671>

On March 29, the China Development Bank agreed with its BRICS' counterparts to eschew dollar lending and extend credit to each other in their own respective currencies. The erosion and loss of the use of the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency means less demand and more dollar selling by central banks around the world, which in turn causes inflation as the dollar weakens against other currencies. Worse, the demise of the dollar's reserve currency status at the same time that federal debt compounds to new heights creates a perfect storm, making a collapse of the dollar closer than most Americans realize.

Impact: $225 billion impact on US economy

Dr. Barry Eichengreen 2011. (PhD; professor of economics and political science at the University of California, Berkeley) Why the Dollar's Reign Is Near an End 1 Mar 2011 WALL STREET JOURNAL Foreign Exchange Report <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703313304576132170181013248.html>

Conversely, life will become easier for European and Chinese banks and companies, which will be able to do more of their international business in their own currencies. The same will be true of companies in other countries that do most of their business with China or Europe. It will be a considerable convenience—and competitive advantage—for them to be able to do that business in yuan or euros rather than having to go through the dollar.  
**U.S.** ImpactIn this new monetary world, moreover, the U.S. government will not be able to finance its budget deficits so cheaply, since there will no longer be as big an appetite for U.S. Treasury securities on the part of foreign central banks. Nor will the U.S. be able to run such large trade and current-account deficits, since financing them will become more expensive. Narrowing the current-account deficit will require exporting more, which will mean making U.S. goods more competitive on foreign markets. That in turn means that the dollar will have to fall on foreign-exchange markets—helping U.S. exporters and hurting those companies that export to the U.S. My calculations suggest that the dollar will have to fall by roughly 20%. Because the prices of imported goods will rise in the U.S., living standards will be reduced by about 1.5% of GDP—$225 billion in today's dollars. That is the equivalent to a half-year of normal economic growth. While this is not an economic disaster, Americans will definitely feel it in the wallet.

9. Reduced US National Security

The US cannot end its security ties with Saudi Arabia.

Anthony H. Cordesman 2010 (holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS); received Dept of Defense Distinguished Service Medal; has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies ; frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community ; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense ) September 14, 2010 “U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation and the Impact of U.S. Arms Sales” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES <http://csis.org/publication/us-saudi-security-cooperation-and-impact-us-arms-sales>

The United States needs all the friends it can find in the Gulf. It faces serious uncertainties in reshaping its security posture in the region as its forces depart from Iraq. These include Iraq’s uncertain future political stance and government, the inability to predict Iranian actions and alignments, the uncertain outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and uncertainties surrounding the success or failure of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia and Reshaping the U.S. Strategic Posture in the Gulf At the same time, several factors are clear. There is no possible “end state” to the U.S. presence in the Gulf nor an end to the need for the strongest possible U.S. security ties to Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in the region.

10. Radical backfire. Pressuring Saudis to make more arrests risks radicalizing family members, fueling more extremism

Dr. Christopher Boucek 2011. (PhD from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of London and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program), September 12, 2011, “Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/8kyf#terror>

Early on, however, Saudi Arabia realized that it did not want to make the same mistakes that Egypt and Syria made when too many people were arrested. Massive, unaccountable arrests run the risk that family members will be radicalized. Riyadh realized that it needed to reduce the impact of arrests and prove to the population that it was working to take care of them. The government and religious authorities worked to drive a wedge between extremists and the public by proving that extremists are not acting in the population’s best interests and funded disengagement and rehabilitation programs. Riyadh put all kinds of resources and money into this and has enjoyed some success, but the sheer amount of financial backing, resources, and top-level focus makes the programs hard to emulate in different countries.

11. Saudis build nuclear weapons

Link: Affirmative removes security guarantees

Link: US security keeps nuclear weapons out of Saudi Arabia

Michael Miner 2011. ( teaching fellow at Harvard Univ.; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and International Society for Iranian Studies) 18 Dec 2011 “Strategic Clarity and the Prospect of a Nuclear Iran” FRONTLINE <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/opinion-strategic-clarity-and-the-prospect-of-a-nuclear-iran.html>

Saudi Arabia represents the most likely state to begin a nuclear program in response to developments in Iran. Riyadh may not feel that a U.S. alliance is adequate enough defense on its own accord. With significant pressure from allies and increased security reassurances, these anxieties can be dealt with through political and economic policies. As a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and given substantial investment in the United States of Saudi assets, it seems reasonable that strategic alliances and guarantees would be adequate to keep nuclear weapons out of Saudi Arabia.

Brink: Saudi Arabia fears Iran getting a nuclear bomb and is considering building one of its own

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power” <http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf> (brackets in original)

Speaking with Western researchers, a senior Saudi diplomat said in 2006 that the best way for the Gulf to respond to an Iranian nuclear capability would be “with another nuclear weapon.” “We are naked,” a Saudi prince recently complained. “We are surrounded by a country that already has a nuclear capability [Israel], and a country that is building it [Iran].”

Link: US partnerships in the Persian Gulf are key to deterring nuclear proliferation.

Anthony H. Cordsman 2010 (Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. Cordesman has directed numerous CSIS study efforts on terrorism, energy, defense panning, modern conflicts, and the Middle East. He has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies on the wars in those countries, and he frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; formerly served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense) September 14, 2010 “U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation and the Impact of U.S. Arms Sales” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES <http://csis.org/publication/us-saudi-security-cooperation-and-impact-us-arms-sales>

Iran remains an emerging challenge. It is deeply involved in strategic competition with the United States and its friends and allies in the region. It is developing steadily better capabilities to attack shipping, targets in the Gulf, and targets on the Saudi and southern Gulf coast, and it is using asymmetric warfare in doing so. It is fielding significant long-range missile forces and may acquire nuclear weapons. If the United States is to deter other regional states from proliferation in reaction to Iran, and make its statements about offering “extended regional deterrence” a credible option, it must show it will do its best to create effective regional partners in the southern Gulf, as well as try to build a strategic partnership with Iraq.

Impact: Proliferation = increased risk of nuclear war

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN 2011 (Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.) March 7, 2011 “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation” THE WALL STREET JOURNAL <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703300904576178760530169414.html>

Today, the Cold War is almost 20 years behind us, but many leaders and publics cannot conceive of deterrence without a strategy of mutual assured destruction. We have written previously that reliance on this strategy is becoming increasingly hazardous. With the spread of nuclear weapons, technology, materials and know-how, there is an increasing risk that nuclear weapons will be used. It is not possible to replicate the high-risk stability that prevailed between the two nuclear superpowers during the Cold War in such an environment. The growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability.

Impact: Nuclear war. Saudis would deploy nuclear weapons not only for deterring war but for fighting one

Dr. Richard L. Russell 2009. (PhD; Professor of National Security Affairs in the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and Adjunct Professor of Security Studies in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University) “Key Determinates of Nuclear Developments in the Middle East” Prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center 1 July 2009 [http://www.npolicy.org/article\_file/Key\_Determinates\_of\_Nuclear\_Developments\_in\_the\_Middle\_East.pdf](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.npolicy.org%2Farticle_file%2FKey_Determinates_of_Nuclear_Developments_in_the_Middle_East.pdf&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNHGXlIxMo8zKwkYkYjYHE2LxcEu6w" \t "_blank)

Another key determinant for nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East is the desire for nuclear weapons to wage war. This view may be startling to observers who judge that nuclear weapons are only good for deterrence and not for warfighting. But the history of nuclear weapons development shows otherwise. The United States and its NATO Allies during the Cold War deployed nuclear weapons in Europe not as some grand deterrent bluff, but because they intended to use them if the Warsaw Pact forces invaded Western Europe with conventional forces. The United States and its Allies worried that Warsaw Pact forces outnumbered and outgunned NATO forces, so the Alliance would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons to blunt a conventional invasion. Middle Eastern states will probably be making similar calculations. Saudi Arabia, for example, might come to think that the early use of nuclear weapons against Iranian forces invading through Kuwait would be wiser statecraft than letting those forces get an operational foothold in the oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, where a largely Shia population is alienated from the Sunni Saudi regime and is sympathetic to Iran.